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THE FLIGHT OF TOXIC TORT - AERIAL
APPLICATION OF INSECTICIDES AND
HERBICIDES: FROM DRIFT LIABILITY TO
TOXIC TORT
RICHARD D. CHAPPUIS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE WEEK BEFORE Labor Day of 1982 was a beautiful
time for golf in the Washington, D.C. area. Mr. X took
advantage of the weather to play several rounds of golf
that week at the Army/Navy Country Club. The previous
week, the country club had applied chlorothalonil, a pesti-
cide, to the course. The multiple exposures that Mr. X
received to the chemical "burned the flesh off his body
from the inside out and caused his internal organs to
fail."'  Mr. X died 20 days later.2
Stories such as this one illustrate the destructive poten-
tial of pesticides on American yards, gardens, golf
courses, ranches, and farms. While the capacity of these
chemicals to boost plant and crop yields cannot be
doubted, society is more frequently questioning the cost
* Richard D. Chappuis, Jr., graduated from Louisiana State University Law
School in 1965. He clerked one year for the Louisiana Supreme Court and there-
after began the practice of law in Lafayette, Louisiana. He has been with the firm
of Voorhies & Labbe since 1968 and is presently its managing partner. Through-
out his years of practice with Voorhies and Labbe, Chappuis has handled exten-
sive litigation in the fields of product liability, toxic torts, professional malpractice
involving architects and engineers, general and agricultural aviation, and munici-
pal and political subdivision legal matters.
I ClaudiaJ. Postell, Pesticide Kills Golfer, Company Settles, TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 91.
2 Id.; see also Claudia J. Postell, Pesticides: How Many Injuries Do They Cause?,
TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 92.
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of these chemicals' use. Scientists voice concerns that res-
idues of pesticides on raw agricultural products may have
lasting, cumulative effects on humans. For example,
DDT causes massive harm to many species of wildlife.4
Agricultural chemical use may be a contributor to non-
point source pollution such as run-off from rain water,
contaminating the groundwater from which our drinking
water springs. 5 Such chemicals allegedly are also involved
with fish kills.6 Agent Orange, a defoliant used in Viet-
nam, injured many American soldiers exposed to the
chemical in combat.7
These claimed long-term effects of the chemicals only
recently have been reaching the courts. The short-term
toxic effects, however, have been litigated in the context
of aerial application since the 1930s.8 The simple fact is
that it is virtually impossible to apply insecticides or herbi-
cides without immediate drift.' Occasionally, chemical
drift causes a problem that is litigated. Three factors af-
fect drift of the chemicals in aerial application: (1) the size
of the spray particle; (2) air agitation produced by the air-
craft; and (3) natural aerial forces.' 0 As an example, one
"droplet of 3 micron size may drift 8 miles in a 3 [mile per
hour] wind when falling from the height of only ten
I Joseph D. Rosen, Much Ado About Alar, CONSUMER REs., Feb. 1991, at 16.
4 Anne Milner, Banned But Not Forgotten, SIERRA, July-Aug. 1986, at 28; Mary
Hager, DDT: The Pesticide That Didn't Go Away, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 4, 1985, at 10.
5 B.J. Wynne III & Carol A. Bradley, Is The 1990 Farm Bill the Opening Shot in A
"Quiet Revolution?", 44 Sw. LJ. 1383, 1383-92 (1991).
6 See infra notes 113-132 and accompanying text.
7 See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
8 S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678 (Ariz, 1933).
9 Sarah E. Redfield, Chemical Trespass? - An Overview of Statutory and Regulatory
Efforts to Control Pesticide Drift, 73 Ky. LJ. 855, 859 (1985); William T. Birmingham
& Jon L. Kyl, Legal and Practical Aspects of Pesticide Spraying Cases, 37 INS. COUNS. J.
585, 587 (1970); Note, Regulation and Liability in the Application of Pesticides, 49 IOWA
L. REV. 135, 136 (1963).
10 Birmingham & Kyl, supra note 9, at 587; Craig A. Kennedy, Liability in the
Aerial Application of Pesticides, 22 S.D. L. REV. 75, 76 (1977) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 114-15 (1969));
Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems In a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV. 69, 73 (1953).
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feet."" The aerial application of herbicides and insecti-
cides thus inherently poses well-documented and thor-
oughly litigated short-term risks because of immediate
effects on neighboring landowners.
Long-term liability for latent or cumulative effects of
these chemicals has only recently come to the fore. Seem-
ingly, the liability of aerial applicators, the farmers they
serve, and the farmers' and applicators' insurers could be
unpredictable and unlimited if the agriculture industry
must bear the burden of liability for the long-term effects
of insecticides and herbicides. A worst-case scenario such
as the asbestos industry, bankrupt and overloaded with li-
ability, immediately comes to mind. 12
Fortunately, such potential ruinous liability has not yet
been pinned on the agriculture industry in the United
States. Toxic tort law in the aerial application context
would have to evolve drastically to accommodate long-
term toxic tort litigation. Only a few halting steps have
been taken in that direction, but analysis of the history of
aerial application of chemicals and litigation in the United
States is in order. Any long-term toxic tort litigation in an
aerial application context must evolve from past prece-
dents. A clear understanding of where the law of aerial
application of chemicals has been is necessary to gauge
where the future might lead.
This article will therefore chart aerial application litiga-
tion and focus on the various state standards of liability
and causation. Damage calculations, indemnification is-
sues, and insurance questions will also be relevant for this
discussion. The article will briefly target various statutory
and regulatory schemes governing the aerial application
of insecticides and herbicides. Finally, recent develop-
' Birmingham & Kyl, supra note 9, at 587; Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems In a
New Industry, supra note 10, at 73.
12 See Cimino v. Raymark Indust., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(opinion includes a history of one federal district court's grappling with an enor-
mous number of asbestos cases).
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The plaintiffs in these aerial application cases are nor-
mally the neighboring landowners or third parties who
live near the fields where the chemicals have been
sprayed. This litigation usually involves at least two, but
potentially four or more defendants.1 3 The obvious de-
fendant is the farmer who ordered and whose crops
benefitted from the aerial application of the chemicals.
The other typical defendant is the aerial application ser-
vice. The plaintiffs might also sue the chemical manufac-
turer for defects in the chemical (i.e., the chemical works
too well, or the manufacturer failed to warn the user of
certain effects of the products) .14 Finally, plaintiffs will al-
most certainly bring into aerial application suits any insur-
ers of the previously mentioned defendants who may be
liable by contract for these damages. 15
B. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY OR FAULT
Several theories of liability for aerial application inju-
ries can be utilized in these cases. Negligence, strict liabil-
ity, nuisance, and trespass have all been the basis for
liability in the various state jurisdictions. For our pur-
poses the southern and western agricultural regions of
this nation provide jurisdictions that illustrate these theo-
ries of liability.
1. Nuisance
American courts, when first confronted with aerial ap-
plication of pesticides, applied the nuisance theory of lia-
'- See infra notes 172-178 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 179-222 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 223-247 and accompanying text.
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bility.' 6 A nuisance is any damage caused by conduct that
is abnormal and out of place in its surroundings. 17 In the
first reported case involving aerial application of a chemi-
cal, S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 8 the Arizona Supreme
Court ruled that the application of chemicals by airplane
to aid agriculture was an inherently dangerous activity. 19
The court held that the farmer who ordered his fields
sprayed with chemicals was strictly liable for the deaths of
his neighbor's bees.20 The bees died when insecticide
sprayed by defendants drifted onto plaintiff's apiaries.
Although the Fricker court did not allude to the nineteenth
century English decision, Rylands v. Fletcher,2' the rationale
behind the decision was similar.2 The "rule" of Rylands
v. Fletcher is that the defendant will be liable when he dam-
ages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and
inappropriate to the place and its surrounding.23
The court in Gainey v. Folkman,2 4 another Arizona prece-
dent, utilizing a nuisance standard, quoted Rylands v.
Fletcher:
If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything
which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neigh-
bor, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause
damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have
been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to pre-
vent the damage.25
The Gainey court also quoted the ancient common law
nuisance maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum no laedas or "so use
your own [property in such a manner] as not to injure
16 S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678, 680 (Ariz. 1933).
'7 WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS § 87, at 583 (3d ed. 1964).
18 27 P.2d 678 (Ariz. 1933). See Peter McBreen, Legal Implications of Agricultural
Aviation, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 399, 400 (1951) (Fricker is the first reported aerial
application case.).
9 Fricker, 27 P.2d at 680.
20 Id.
2, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
22 Fricker, 27 P.2d at 680.
23 WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS § 77, at 522 (3d ed. 1964).
24 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953).
25 Id. at 232 (quoting Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. at 340).
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others (property)." 6 The Gainey case involved a cattle
farmer who claimed cropdusting with DDT by another
farmer in the area harmed his herd of cattle and family.
The plaintiff claimed "that the toxic character of the
chemicals used and the absence of full knowledge or pres-
ence of uncertainty as to their effects would warrant the
court in preventing the defendant from injecting the
chemicals into the air over the plaintiff's ranch."127 The
Gainey court described its nuisance liability threshold as
the deliberate impregnation of the air over another's land
with chemicals dangerous to livestock or humans.2 ' Nev-
ertheless, the plaintiff's failure to prove any damage to
humans or livestock barred his claim.2 9
In essence, courts that have utilized the nuisance doc-
trine to determine liability based their decisions on the
presumption of aerial applications of chemicals to crops
as inherently dangerous. Plaintiffs who can prove injury
to property or persons will recover.
In the past, however, California courts have utilized a
quasi nuisance standard of liability, even while expressly
stating that cropdusting is lawful and necessary."0 The
Miles v. A. Arena & Co. 3 1 court referred to standards of care
and foreseeability, thoroughly confusing attempts to de-
cide whether this case was grounded in nuisance or negli-
gence. 2 In Miles, the plaintiff sued and recovered
damages when dust drifted onto his bee apiaries from de-
fendant's cropdusting. 33
2. Trespass
California courts tried a new basis of liability, trespass,
in disposing of the next group of aerial application cases,
26 Id.; see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (6th ed. 1990).
27 Gainey, 115 F. Supp. at 236.
28 Id. at 236-37.
29 Id. at 240.
so See, e.g., infra note 31.
31 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937).




which again involved bees. In Lenk v. Spezia 3 4 andJeanes v.
Holtz,3 5 California courts of appeal rendered verdicts
against plaintiffs whose bees allegedly died as a result of
the aerial applications of chemicals to fields near their api-
aries. In the Lenk decision, the court found that though
the bees died in great numbers around their apiary, the
trespassing of the bees onto the recently sprayed farm-
land caused their deaths.3 6 Though the defendants knew
of the harmful effects of the chemicals on the bees, the
court found that the plaintiffs could only recover if they
proved the defendants distributed the spray wantonly,
maliciously, or deliberately to destroy the bees.3 7 The
plaintiffs in Lenk could not meet this burden; in fact the
defendants warned the plaintiffs of the dusting, but the
plaintiffs refused to move the bee apiaries away from the
fields to be dusted. 8
In Jeanes v. Holtz, the trial court sustained the defend-
ants' demurrer and dismissed the suit.3 9 The plaintiffs re-
lied on the negligence per se theory claiming that the
defendants failed to warn them of exposure to poison on
their land as required by a California statute.40 The court
noted that the statute did not apply to bees.4 Further,
since the plaintiffs did not allege that the aerial applica-
tion of the chemical actually reached the apiaries, the de-
fendants could not be liable.42 The only way the spraying
could have affected the bees was if the bees trespassed on
the defendants' property.43
In Schronk v. Gilliam,44 a Texas court addressed whether
34 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
15 211 P.2d 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
36 Lenk, 213 P.2d at 53.
31 Id. at 51.
31 Id. at 52-53.
19 Jeanes, 211 P.2d at 926.
40 Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 596 (West 1988) (poisoning animals; exceptions;
posting warning signs).
41 Jeanes, 211 P.2d at 926.
42 Id. at 927-28.
43 Id.
41 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ).
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trespass of defendant's airplane could be a basis for liabil-
ity.45 The court analyzed the decision by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Caus by 46 and
found that plaintiffs could assert a cause of action for
overflight of their fields if the flight enters the immediate
airspace adjacent to the plaintiff's property and the flight
of the aerial applicator unreasonably interfered with
plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property.47 Since the de-
fendant's airplane flew over plaintiffs' land with its spray-
ing equipment operational, defendant's plane directly
caused injury to plaintiffs' crops.48 The Arizona Supreme
Court penalized a cropduster for an identical trespass in
Sanders v. Beckwith. 49
3. Strict Liability
Louisiana became the first jurisdiction to impose strict
liability on farmers and aerial applicators of herbicides
and insecticides in Gotreaux v. Gary.50 The fact pattern of
the Gotreaux case is unremarkable. Defendant Gary con-
tracted with Welch Flying Service to spray his rice crop
with 2,4-D, a hormone-type herbicide. While Welch was
spraying the field, the wind rose and forced Welch to ter-
minate operations. The court found that the wind also
apparently facilitated the drift of the already applied her-
bicide onto plaintiff Gotreaux's cotton.5
Since no causation question remained, the court only
had to decide the basis of liability on which plaintiff would
recover.12 The Louisiana Supreme Court cited Article
667 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which stated that
"[a]lthough a proprietor may do with his estate whatever
he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may
45 Id. at 744.
4-6 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
17 Schronk, 380 S.W.2d at 745.
48 Id.
49 283 P.2d 235, 239 (Ariz. 1955).
50 94 So. 2d 293, 295 (La. 1957).




deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him."5 3
The court then adopted the doctrine of strict liability
for all aerial application cases in Louisiana, analogizing
this case to a prior Louisiana precedent in which the court
mandated strict liability for all explosive cases. 54 The fol-
lowing quote from the court's opinion in Fontenot v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. 55 articulates the foundation of strict
liability for aerial application cases in Louisiana:
We are unwilling to follow any rule which rejects the doc-
trine of absolute liability in cases of this nature and prefer
to base our holding on the doctrine that negligence or
fault, in these instances, is not a requisite to liability, irre-
spective of the fact that the activities resulting in damages
are conducted with assumed reasonable care and in ac-
cordance with modem and accepted methods.5 6
Three other states followed Louisiana's lead and de-
fined aerial application of chemicals as an ultra hazardous
activity, which necessitates strict liability should damage
to others or their property occur.57
4. Negligence
Many jurisdictions purport to utilize a negligence stan-
dard for liability in aerial application cases. Generally,
though, the threshold level of negligence needed for
plaintiff's recovery is minimal. In these cases, the courts
demand that aerial application meet a standard of care
relevant to the circumstances of the operation.58 As pre-
viously mentioned, the unpredictability of drift of pesti-
cides is a constant and nearly unpreventable cause of most
- Id. (quoting LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 667 (West 1980)).
Id. at 295 (citing Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So. 2d 845, 849
(La. 1955)).
55 80 So. 2d 845, 849 (La. 1955).
56 Id.
57 Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 833-34 (Okla. 1961); Loe v. Lenhardt, 362
P.2d 312, 318 (Or. 1961); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 223 (Wash.
1977).
5, Kennedy, supra note 10, at 87.
1992] 419
420 JOURNAL OF AIR IA WAND COMMERCE
litigation.59 Accordingly, the state courts' views of the na-
ture of aerial application as "inherently or extremely dan-
gerous" calibrates the burden plaintiffs must satisfy to
prove liability. Most courts hold aerial applicators and the
farmers for whom they work to a very high standard of
care because of the recognized danger of the operation.6 °
Although normally treated as a question of law, at least
one state, Arkansas, has left the question of inherent dan-
gerousness of aerial application for the jury.6 ' The "in-
herent dangerousness" approach of the courts results in
the minimal plaintiff burden for liability.
The slight burden necessary to prove liability and vary-
ing theories of liability within one jurisdiction are exem-
plified by Texas jurisprudence in this area. Texas courts
imposed liability on aerial applicators for negligence in al-
lowing herbicides to drift and settle upon neighboring
crops. 62  An earlier Texas precedent, however, con-
demned an aerial applicator because he applied 2,4-D
knowing, or with reason to believe, that it would be injuri-
ous to cotton.63 The Texas courts are adamant that ac-
tionable negligence occur before defendants will be held
liable; i.e., if the jury finds that simple drift of herbicide
onto neighboring fields does not equal negligence, that
59 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
60 Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d 340, 343 (Ala. 1976).
Liability is not absolute but is imposed on the landowner for his fail-
ure to exercise due care in a situation in which the work being per-
formed is sufficiently dangerous that the landowner himself has a
duty to third persons who may sustain injury or damage from the
work unless proper precautions are taken in the performance
thereof.
Id. See also Ligocky v. Wilcox, 620 P.2d 1300, 1302 (N.M. 1980) ("As the danger
that should reasonably be foreseen increases, so the amount of care required also
increases.")
6 J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Ark. Ct. App.
1979).
612 Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1961); Boyd
v. Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co., 450 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1970, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Leonard v. Abbott, 357 S.W.2d 778, 780-81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 366 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1963).




jury verdict will be sustained. 64 The earlier discussed
Schronk decision also used trespass as a basis for liability.65
Overall, the Texas courts maintain a low threshold for
proving negligence, but the jury verdict still provides a
mechanism by which defendants may escape liability.
Other states mandate similarly slight threshold levels
for aerial applicator liability. In Heeb v. Prysock,66 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court imposed liability on a farmer be-
cause he knew or should have known that, when applied
by airplane, 2,4-D would drift from his field onto the
plaintiff's.6 7 In Devane v. Smith,68 a Georgia court of ap-
peals permitted the trial court to instruct the jury as to the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., the thing speaks for it-
self.69 In Devane, the defendant's control of the plane, the
absence of contributory negligence on the part of plain-
tiff, and crop damage in rows, which ordinarily does not
occur without negligence, all add up to a situation in
which the inference of negligence assures the plaintiff the
right to get to the jury. In Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters,
Inc.,7 1 the defendants were liable because they knew or
should have known that the wind would carry the defoli-
ant onto plaintiff's cotton crop at the time of
application.72
III. CAUSATION
When herbicides or insecticides drift or are accidentally
applied to unintended areas, liability is normally not a
- Gamblin v. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no
writ); Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
65 Schronk, 380 S.W.2d at 745-46.
- 245 S.W.2d 577 (Ark. 1952).
67 Id. at 578-79.
- 268 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
69 Id. at 712-13; see also Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 268 P.2d 1041, 1055 (Cal.
1954) (trial court justified in giving jury instructions reading doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur).
70 Devane, 268 S.W.2d at 712.
71 257 P.2d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
72 Id. at 655.
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high barrier to recovery for the person whose property or
health is harmed. The major obstacle for many plaintiffs
to overcome is causation. Proof that the defendant's ae-
rial application of chemicals actually or, occasionally,
proximately caused the damage or injury can be difficult.
The proof needed for causation can generally be divided
into three categories: injury to crops or plants, injury to
animals, and injury to humans.
A. CROPS
1. Cotton
The 2,4-D herbicide can be extremely toxic to cotton, a
broad-leaf plant, but is very helpful when applied to nar-
row-leaf or grass plants such as rice. In the south, where
both crops are staple agricultural products grown in close
proximity, drift of chemicals can cause serious problems.
This reality is amply reflected in the litigation history.
Testimony in a case where cotton was damaged by 2,4-D
reflects the condition of the cotton after the aerial applica-
tion: "[The] unmistakable signs of 2,4-D damage .
[were] that the leaves had become narrow, elongated,
crinkled and ruffled around the edges and in addition the
squares and flowers were deformed. '73
These effects of 2,4-D on cotton influence defendants
to attempt to prove that: (1) the herbicide that landed on
plaintiff's crops could not have come from the spraying
on defendant's land due to weather, time, or distance lim-
itations or (2) plaintiff's crops were not actually injured by
the 2,4-D as pest infestation already had or would eventu-
ally have injured plaintiff's crops. Of course, the plaintiff
must prove his case only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. If a plaintiff can present credible expert testimony
of his crop loss and evidence that defendant's application
of herbicides was the sole spraying in the area, the plain-
tiff generally prevails.
Because strict liability governs cases of aerial applica-
73 Jones v. Morgan, 96 So. 2d 109, 110 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
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tion of herbicides in Louisiana, causation is normally the
crux of such litigation. Two Louisiana cases exemplify the
causation patterns in such litigation involving cotton
crops. In Jones v. Morgan,75 the plaintiffs established cau-
sation against defendants by creating a record that
proved: (1) their crops showed symptoms of damage by
2,4-D, and (2) the only 2,4-D spraying in proximity to
their cotton was done by defendants. 76 In Jones, the de-
fendants were unsuccessful in arguing that plaintiff's fail-
ure to designate a specific date on which the spraying
occurred and an exact correlation in time between that
date and the crop damage was fatal to plaintiff's case."
In Trahan v. Bearb,78 the defendant did not appeal the
trial court finding that defendant's 2,4-D landed on plain-
tiff's crops. Instead, the defendant attacked the plaintiff's
proof of loss in ultimate yield of cotton. 79 The defendant
noted excessive rain and insect infestation in the area for
the period in question as well as low yields for the sur-
rounding area in general.80 The counter to defendant's
attack was plaintiff's award-winning use of modern scien-
tific agricultural practices as testified to by the County
Agent of Lafayette Parish.8' The court found that plaintiff
satisfied his preponderance of the evidence burden of
proof.8 2
Texas litigation provides numerous instances of aerial
applications' damage to cotton.83 In Pitchfork Land and
Cattle Co. v. King,84 plaintiff's cotton was damaged by a
74 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
75 96 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
76 Id. at 111.
77 Id. at 110-11.
78 138 So. 2d 420 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
79 Id. at 421.
80 Id. at 422-23.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 423.
83 Pitchfork Land, 346 S.W.2d 598; Gragg v. Allen, 481 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1972, writ dism'd); Schronk, 380 S.W.2d 743; Leonard v. Abbott, 357
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 366 S.W.2d
925 (Tex. 1963); Vrazel, 294 S.W.2d 148; Schultz, 271 S.W.2d 696.
- 346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1961).
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herbicide. Defendants pointed to irregularities in time
and the drift pattern effect of the herbicide on plaintiff's
crops to prove that their spraying did not actually cause
the damage. Plaintiffs documented that no other spraying
occurred within a fifty mile radius during the period in
question. The defendants tirelessly tried to establish that
the narrow one and one half to two mile wide and eight
mile long damage pattern northeast of their farm could
not have resulted from their spraying operations, which
occurred seven and one-half miles from the nearest cot-
ton farm. Extensive testimony on wind direction and ve-
locity was presented to the jury on this point, but the
Texas Supreme Court concluded that the jury verdict
against defendant was sufficiently grounded in the evi-
dence so as to preclude reversal.8 5
Another inconsistency focused on by the defendants in
Pitchfork Land was the delay between the time that the
damage should have occurred as established by expert
testimony and the time that farmers reported the herbi-
cide damage. Experts concluded that the damage should
have been present seven to ten days after the spraying, yet
the plaintiffs did not observe the harmful effects until ap-
proximately sixteen to eighteen days later. The Texas
Supreme Court dismissed this argument by noting that
damage could have occurred on time, but the farmers
would not have been looking closely enough for such ef-
fects to be noticed. 6
Another Texas case directly on point is Leonard v. Ab-
bott.a7 The trial judge rested his causation finding on a
8s Id. at 602.
86 Id. at 600.
87 357 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962), rev'don other grounds, 366
S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1963); see also Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. King, 317 S.W.2d 602,
604-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1958, no writ) (court admitted evidence of
weather condititons to establish drift in support of plaintiff's allegation of negli-
gence); Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433, 435-36 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ) (plaintiff need only show evidence of herbicide
damage to the crop, no other spraying in the area, and the occurrence of damage
after spraying to satisfy burden of causation).
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combination of circumstantial evidence.88 Defendants ap-
plied a herbicide by aerial spraying in winds of ten to
twenty-five miles per hour blowing toward plaintiff's
crops. A herbicide such as that used by defendant dam-
aged plaintiff's crops in a swath originating at plaintiff's
property line. Defendant's application of the herbicide
was the only one in the area in this time period. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, stat-
ing that although the evidence was circumstantial, it was
sufficient.8 9
2. Soybeans
The chemicals that damage cotton plants cause similar
injury to the broad-leaf plant, soybean. One of the more
interesting causation cases involved damage to a soybean
crop allegedly caused by the aerial applicator. In Mayeux
v. Cane-Air, Inc.,90 a farmer engaged Cane-Air, an aerial
applicator, to spray his soybeans with methyl parathion,
an insecticide, and benlate, a fungicide. After the first two
applications, the plaintiff-farmer noticed yellowing of his
beans and complained to the applicator and his County
Agent. Plaintiff sued and obtained a trial court verdict on
the basis that phenoxy chemical had been improperly ap-
plied to his crop through Cane-Air's application of the in-
secticide and fungicide. 9'
The litigants presented three possible explanations for
how the phenoxy chemical could have reached the soy-
beans: (1) the methyl parathion was contaminated with
the chemical; (2) residue from a prior spraying by Cane-
Air remained in the tanks of the plane which sprayed
Mayeux's field; and (3) Mayeux himself applied the phe-
noxy. The appellate court disposed of the first theory by
noting that the trial court did not find the chemical com-
pany liable for contamination of the methyl parathion be-
Leonard, 357 S.W.2d at 781.
89 Id.
9 426 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
91 Id. at 307.
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cause all experts agreed that the quantity of contaminate
in the insecticide could not have damaged the crop. 92 Re-
garding the second argument, the plane used by Cane-Air
to. spray Mayeux's field did apply a phenoxy chemical
prior to spraying the field, however, this was not the im-
mediately priorjob. Louisiana state regulations requiring
that aerial applicators flush their planes' tanks and equip-
ment when changing from a herbicide to an insecticide
did not apply.93 No testimony was heard on the exact pro-
cess used by Cane-Air on this particular job or its general
policy.
The trial judge erred by concluding that the lack of tes-
timony about the flushing of Cane-Air's tanks before
spraying Mayeaux's field favored judgment for the plain-
tiff.94 Since this case did not involve damage to a neigh-
boring property owner from aerial application,
Louisiana's strict liability rule did not govern.95 Plaintiff
bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the ev-
idence that Cane-Air negligently caused the damage to
plaintiff's crops. 9 6 Plaintiff testified that he personally ap-
plied a phenoxy chemical to the area around his field to
combat weeds. Since it was just as likely that the damage
occurred from the direct application of phenoxy to the
field by Mayeux, the plaintiff did not carry his burden of
proof.97
3. Trees and Gardens
Two other Louisiana cases dealt with aerial applications
that allegedly damaged trees or yards. In Williams v. In-
dustrial Helicopters, Inc.,98 a property owner sued the aerial
application service hired by an electric company to spray
its right-of-way for damages to 120 trees subsequently
902 Id. at 309.
93 Id. at 311.
94 Id.
95 Cane-Air, 426 So. 2d at 307.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 311.
98 519 So. 2d 1180, 1185-86 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
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felled by the electric company. Plaintiff's theory was that
the spraying by Industrial one month prior to the first fel-
ling of trees by the electric company provided the impetus
to cut the dead trees. However, evidence of a southern
pine beetle outbreak prior to this time frame provided an-
other colorable theory behind why the trees died and had
to be cut down. Also, the dead trees were surrounded by
healthy vegetation. Therefore, plaintiff did not prove
more likely than not that Industrial's spraying caused the
damage in question, and the appellate court reversed the
judgment. 99
In Augustine v. Dickenson,100 an aerial application of para-
quat, a defoliant used to prepare fields for planting,
drifted onto neighboring homes. Immediately after the
spraying incident, the only such incident near the homes
within this time frame, plaintiffs noticed tree leaves wilt-
ing and most other plants dying. An official of the Louisi-
ana Department of Agriculture visited plaintiffs' homes
and testified to the widespread defoliation typical of the
effect of paraquat. The Augustine court upheld the lower
court's decision that the defendant's spraying operation
caused the plaintiffs' loss. 0 1
B. ANIMALS
1. Cattle
Plaintiff cattle owners have had a difficult time proving
that aerial spraying of chemicals actually caused injury to
their animals. 10 2 In two cases on the subject, defendants
- Id. at 1186; see also Stirling v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 344 So. 2d 427,
429 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (court held power company could spray chemicals from
helicopters as long as it stayed within servitude); Kell v. Appalachian Power Co.,
289 S.E.2d 450, 457 (W. Va. 1982) (court held that the' power company did not
have authorization to spray toxic herbicides by aerial broadcast spraying to clear
right of way); Thad S. Huffman, Comment, Kell v. Appalachian Power Co.: Aerial
Application of Herbicides on Utility Right-of-Ways, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 995 (1983).
-0 406 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
II Id. at 308-09.
102 But see McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (swine farmer recovered for death of hogs when
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prevailed each time. °3 In Watson v. Mid-Continent Aerial
Sprayers, Inc. ,04 plaintiff sued the defendant for damage to
his cattle allegedly caused by heptachlor, a fire ant poison.
After application of heptachlor to defendant's field, plain-
tiff found granules of the poison on his property. Subse-
quently, thirty-one cattle died and sixty-nine became ill.
The symptoms of the sick and dying cattle were consistent
with heptachlor poisoning. On the other hand, defend-
ant's numerous witnesses testified that heptachlor could
not cause death or sickness in cattle. Furthermore, exami-
nations of the deceased cattle did not disclose traces of
heptachlor. On these facts, the appellate court found that
plaintiff did not establish actual cause and could not
recover. 
05
Similarly, in Gainey v. Folkman,10 6 a cattleman sued a
neighboring farmer to stop him from cropdusting on his
property because of alleged damage to cattle and humans
on his cattle ranch.10 7 Plaintiff alleged that the "dusting"
drifted onto his property and his cattle ingested the spray
on the alfalfa they ate resulting in an "unthrifty" condi-
tion. The aerial applications occurred in 1951 and 1952.
Plaintiff reported no deleterious effects from the 1952
spraying. The only direct effect of the spraying was
smarting of the eyes when the spray reached persons at
the cattle ranch. Plaintiff's foreman's wife, who alleged
aggravation of a preexisting condition because of the
spraying, was not tested for toxic effects. A nationally rec-
ognized toxicologist and a biochemist both testified that
the amounts of DDT (dichloro-diphenal-trichloroethane),
Ben-Hex (benzine hexachloride) and parathion used for
cropdusting were not likely to cause harm in warm-
he proved: (1) the only application in area was by the defendant, and (2) the hogs
had traces of arsenic poison).
103 See Watson v. Mid-Continent Aerial Sprayers, Inc., 170 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct.
App. 1964); Gainey v. Folkman, 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953).
104 170 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
105 Id. at 151-52.
106 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953).
107 Id. at 232.
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blooded animals or humans. Autopsies confirmed that
the amount of DDT found in two dead animals could not
fatally injure them."o Overall, the plaintiff's evidence did
not preponderate in order to permit recovery. 10 9
2. Bees
Historically, one of the creatures most affected by aerial
application of chemicals has been bees." Of course,
since insecticide use targeted eradication of all insects, the
chemicals did not always discriminate between the valua-
ble bees and pests. Causation in these cases was linked to
liability. If the plaintiff proved that the spraying actually
reached his bee apiaries on initial application of the chem-
ical, he usually would recover."' If the bees died because
of poison they encountered on foraging on defendant's
land, the defendant would get the judgment." 2 Insecti-
cides now can discriminate between bees and other in-
sects, leaving the bees unharmed.
C. AQUACULTURE
The Gulf South region in recent years has increasingly
relied on farming operations to produce seafood formerly
only available by fishing or boating. The drift of toxic
herbicides and insecticides to water life through ordinary
drainage is almost unpreventable. Several cases docu-
ment damage to water life caused by aerial application of
chemicals. " l3
108 Id.
1- Id. at 240.
110 S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678 (Ariz. 1933); Lenk v. Spezia, 213
P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949);Jeanes v. Holtz, 211 P.2d 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949);
Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); Bennett v. Larsen
Co., 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
11 See, e.g., Fricker, 27 P.2d at 679; Miles, 73 P.2d at 1261.
112 See, e.g.,Jeanes, 211 P.2d at 925; Lenk, 213 P.2d at 49.
1s See Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d 340 (Ala. 1976); Kentucky Aerospray, Inc.
v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); South Lafourche Crawfish Farm,
Inc. v. Cajun Flying Serv., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1271 (La. Ct. App. 1981); D & W
Jones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979).
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In Kentucky Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays,'" 4 a commercial min-
now dealer sued a farmer for the destruction of 150,000
to 170,000 minnows stored in a pond adjacent to the
farmer's tobacco field." 5 The pond was 110 feet away
from the tobacco. A sample of water from the pond taken
one day after the spraying found 1.5 parts toxaphene to
every million parts water, a level which is toxic to fish.
Plaintiff and a neighbor, though they did not actually see
the chemical spray fall into the water, saw mist from the
aircraft doing the spraying, and the fumes were so bad
near the pond as to force them inside. The court found
causation was satisfied." 6
D & WJones, Inc. v. Collier 1 7 presented some advance
warning of the liability and causation factors in future
toxic tort cases."' D & W Jones, Inc. operated catfish
farms at two locations in Washington County, Mississippi.
Each of the farms suffered damage allegedly from agricul-
tural chemicals that killed the fish. The catfish farmer, in
two separate suits, sued various farmers and their aerial
application agents for the injuries incurred at the respec-
tive catfish farms. The trial court promptly dismissed
these suits due to misjoinder of parties and causes of
action. 119
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial
court. 120 The court found that the aerial applications of
the toxaphene by each individual farmer named in the suit
probably could not alone have contaminated the
ponds. 12 ' The court held, however, that the cumulative
effect of the successive individual applications of toxa-
phene by the neighboring farms could result in a single,
- 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
15 Id. at 461.
116 Id. at 462.
17 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979).
11 Id. at 292-94.
",9 Id. at 288.
o20 Id. at 294.
121 Id. at 293.
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indivisible injury to the catfish farms. 122 The court ruled
that each of the farmers knew or should have known that
the other farmers were applying toxaphene in the area
and that a five parts per million concentration in the cat-
fish ponds would contaminate the ponds. 23 The court re-
manded the cases for trials on the merits. 124 The D & W
Jones, Inc. decision could foreshadow litigation in which
farmers, aerial applicators and manufacturers are held
jointly and severally liable for cumulative toxic effects to
rivers, groundwater, humans, and animals. 25
The Louisiana decision South Lafourche Crawfish Farm,
Inc. v. Cajun Flying Service, Inc. ,126 again showcased a situa-
tion in which a customer sued an aerial applicator for neg-
ligence.127 The crawfish farmer allegedly contracted with
the aerial applicator to kill only broad-leaf vegetation in
the crawfish ponds. The aerial applicator consulted with a
chemical company who recommended Weed Master, a
general purpose herbicide composed of 2,4-D, Amine,
and Banvel. After the aerial applicator completed the
job, the crawfish farmer sued claiming the chemical killed
all of the vegetation in the ponds, and the resulting decay
deprived the ponds of oxygen. 2  The crawfish ponds
produced no crawfish the next year.
The Louisiana court of appeals found that even assum-
ing that the oxygen depletion from the aerial application
caused the crawfish to leave the pond, the aerial applica-
tor could not be held liable.' 29 The aerial applicator ac-
complished its goal: to kill the vegetation. Overall, the
heart of plaintiff's complaint, that the requested use of
only 2,4-D would not have killed all of the vegetation, was
122 D & WJones, Inc., 372 So. 2d at 294.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
126 394 So. 2d 1271 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
127 Id. at 1272.
128 Id. at 1272-73.
129 Id.
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not proven at trial.' 30 The plaintiff never proved that the
2,4-D would have killed less vegetation and caused less
oxygen depletion than the Weed Master.' 3 ' Also, other
factors could have caused the pond failure. 32
D. HUMANS
One of the first reported cases involving injury to
humans allegedly caused by aerial application of chemi-
cals was Lawler v. Skelton.13 3 The plaintiff, Lawler, was
welding at his cotton gin adjacent to defendant's field,
which was being sprayed with malathion and endrin. On a
pass over the field the pilot covered the plaintiff and his
assistant with the liquid. The chemicals got into plain-
tiff's mouth, nose and throat and covered his back, neck
and face. The plaintiff immediately choked and had
trouble catching his breath. Although he became dizzy
and nauseated, he continued to work that afternoon.
That night plaintiff became ill, but he went to work the
next day. Several hours later his fever went up, and he
went into a coma. Malathion and endrin are undisputedly
extremely toxic to humans. 3 4 Although there was some
evidence of plaintiff's preexisting conditions, i.e. emphy-
sema and bronchitis, the court noted that the great weight
of the evidence showed that the direct spraying of plaintiff
by the aerial applicator caused his illness. 3 5 Therefore,
the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict
against the plaintiff.'3 6
A Louisiana case, Mangham v. Mid-Continent Aircraft
Corp.,"37 presented the scenario of a family home sprayed
by an aerial applicator. Plaintiffs, Mangham, his family,
and his friends, were at the home and came into direct
'so Id. at 1273.
13, Id.
132 Id. The court did not mention the other possible factors.
13 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961).
'34 Id. at 568.
135 Id. at 568-69.
136 Id. at 569
"-7 284 So. 2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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contact with the herbicide. They alleged that, after this
occurrence, a recurrent rash appeared on parts of their
bodies causing pain, mental anguish, disfigurement, and
disability. 3 8 The jury at the trial court level denied all of
plaintiffs' personal injury claims but awarded $1000 in
property damages.' 39 Evidently, the plaintiffs' doctor
convinced the jury that scabies or mite bites caused the
condition, not an allergic reaction to a herbicide.' 40
In Ford v. Shallow Airport,14 plaintiffs asserted that the
parathion applied by defendant to an adjacent farm
drifted onto their peach orchard. After presentation of all
the evidence by each side, the defendant obtained a di-
rected verdict. Plaintiff, Ms. Ford, testified that she be-
came nauseated while harvesting peaches in their orchard
and later when she was processing the peaches, she be-
came violently ill. The defect in the plaintiffs' case was
that they had not presented any specific evidence that
drift onto their property had occurred. 142 The evidence
reflected that neither of the plaintiffs saw the plane pass
over their home, saw a pesticide drift, or smelled an odor.
Furthermore, the defendant pilot testified that drift under
the climatic conditions present would only result in a
maximum drift of twenty-five feet. Plaintiffs' home was
several hundred feet from the spraying.
Finally, two other cases involve aerial applicators physi-
cally hitting their flagmen with their planes. 43 Proper
procedure in aerial application sometimes requires a flag-
man who guides the plane in its operation. The flagman
is supposed to take fourteen steps away from his previous
position in the same direction after each pass.' The
Cannon v. Jones decision turned on the jury finding that
13s Id. at 348.
139 Id.
140 Id.
-4- 492 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142 Id. at 657.
143 Riddle v. Little, 488 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Ark. 1972); Cannon v. Jones, 377 So. 2d
1055, 1056 (Miss. 1979).
144 Riddell, 488 S.W.2d at 36; Cannon, 377 So. 2d at 1056.
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plaintiff's contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of his death when struck by the aerial applicator.'45
Plaintiff moved only two, not the required fourteen, steps
away from his previous position. Defendant pilot, follow-
ing the standard procedure of watching for electric wires,
could not see plaintiff and thus hit him. The Riddell v. Lit-
tle decision's pivotal finding was that the aerial applicator
pilot's failure to have a license did not justify, on its own,
an instruction to the jury that it is evidence of negli-
gence. 4 6 In order to submit that issue to the jury, a
causal link between the lack of licensing and the alleged
injury must exist. 47 The court reversed and remanded
the case because of a faulty jury change. 48
IV. DAMAGES
Several jurisdictions throughout the south and west
agree on the following measure of recovery for crop dam-
ages. 49 First, assess the market value of the estimated
crop before the aerial application damage occurred.
Next, determine the actual value of the product produced
after damage. From the difference of these two figures,
subtract the costs of marketing, harvesting, or transport-
ing the produce to market. This number represents an
estimate of damages incurred.
Variations in achieving these calculations exist as well.
Arkansas courts condemn utilizing previous annual yields
in order to establish what the probable yield would have
been without aerial application damage. 50 Louisiana, on
the other hand, averages the yields of prior years in order
145 Cannon, 377 So. 2d at 1058-59.
146 Riddell, 488 S.W.2d at 39.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Lowe v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 802 F.2d 310, 311 (8th Cir. 1986);
J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979);
Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters, Inc., 257 P.2d 653, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Tra-
han v. Bearb, 138 So. 2d 420, 423-24 (La. Ct. App. 1962);Jones, 96 So. 2d at 112-
13; Boyett v. Enders, 456 S.W.2d 701, 701-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no
writ); Schultz, 271 S.W.2d at 696-97.
150 J.L. Wilson Farms, 590 S.W.2d at 45.
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to assess the estimated value of an uninjured crop. 151 Of
course, almost every court agrees that these figures are
only approximate. If the plaintiff successfully proves the
defendant's fault, the court should exercise great liberal-
ity and discretion so as not to deprive the plaintiff from a
remedy for lack of exact proof.152
In DeVane v. Smith,'5 3 the defendant charged that the
jury's calculation of damages could not be correct because
plaintiff offered no proof of his costs thereby omitting
facts necessary to that calculation. The Georgia court of
appeals ruled that plaintiff's evidence of the "character of
the soil, the condition of the crop prior to injury, the char-
acter of the cultivation of the cotton crop, the actual yield
of the cotton crop, the probable yield of the cotton crop,
the nature of the seasons, and comparisons with prior
crops on the same land" authorized the jury to reach a
figure as to the amount of lost profits. 154 Likewise in Au-
gustine v. Dickenson,' 55 when garden produce was damaged
by aerial application, plaintiff's evidence on the types of
vegetables produced, row length, expected yield, and
wholesale values furnished sufficient quantitative proof to
estimate damages. 56
In Schultz v. Harless,'5 7 extrapolation of later year's
yields was sufficient to estimate damages despite three dif-
ferences: (1) the weather was much harsher in the year of
aerial application; (2) the farmers were different; and (3)
the type of cotton planted was also different.15 In Lowe v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 59 the plaintiff testified that
"it costs just as much to harvest a poor acre of beans as it
15, Jones, 96 So. 2d at 112.
152 Lowe, 802 F.2d at 311; Augustine v. Dickerson, 406 So. 2d 306, 308-09 (La.
Ct. App. 1981); Boyett, 456 S.W.2d at 702; Schultz, 271 S.W.2d at 697-98.
' ' 268 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
'5 Id. at 712.
406 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
'5 Id. at 308.
1-7 271 S.W.2d. 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, no writ).
,51 Id. at 698.
159 802 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1986).
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does a good acre of beans."'' 60 Based on this testimony,
the court sustained a jury verdict that did not subtract
harvesting costs from lost profits.' 6 1 In calculation of
damages, any other compensation received by the farmer
must be deducted from the award. 62
Injury to animals allows damage awards on much the
same basis. In S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 161 compensating
a plaintiff for damage to his bee apiaries required assess-
ment of the market value of the apiaries before injury mi-
nus the value after rebuilding certain apiaries plus
compensation to plaintiff for the rebuilding and clean-up
and stop-gap expenses incurred by plaintiff to mitigate his
damages. 16' In Eubanks v. Gore,' 65 the Louisiana court cal-
culated damages to cattle by establishing a list of animals
and their weights and determining their value lost if in-
jured or killed according to daily cattle market reports of
the area.166
While punitive damage awards in aerial application liti-
gation appear to be nonexistent or unreported, in SKF
Farms v. Superior Court,'67 a California court of appeal de-
clared that, at least on the pleadings, if proved, an aerial
application injury might warrant punitive damages. 68
Statutory provisions should be examined within each ju-
risdiction for application of punitive damages in these
types of cases. For instance, Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.5 specifically permits exemplary damages: "[I]f it is
proved that plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defend-
ant's wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the
storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic
-6 Id. at 311.
161 Id.
162 J.L. Wilson Farms, 590 S.W.2d at 46 (deducting a farmer's disaster corpora-
tion check from the damage award).
163 27 P.2d 678 (Ariz. 1933).
164 Id. at 681.
161 269 So. 2d 258 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
66 Id. at 261.
167 200 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
- Id. at 500.
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substances."' 6 9
V. INDEMNIFICATION FOR LIABILITY
Once a plaintiff establishes liability, causation, and
damages, the defendants then concentrate on their indi-
vidual liability. Culpable parties who may provide oppor-
tunity for indemnification are the farmer or landowner
whose property is sprayed, the aerial applicator, the man-
ufacturer of the pesticide and various insurers.
A. AERIAL APPLICATORS AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
In many cases, the aerial applicators and the farmers or
landowners who contract their services are jointly and
severally liable for any damages caused by aerial applica-
tion. 70  In Louisiana, the strict liability principle dis-
cussed earlier' 7 ' assures that the landowner who conducts
cropdusting on his property becomes solidarily liable with
his agent or contractor, namely the aerial applicator, to
the person injured. 172 Of course, even in this scenario, if
one party can prove the negligence of the other in causing
plaintiff's injury, it is possible for that party to exonerate
himself from liability by indemnification.
Common law jurisdictions ordinarily dictate that per-
sons are not liable for the torts of their independent con-
tractors.173 An exception to this general rule exists for
one who employs a contractor to carry on an inherently or
intrinsically dangerous activity.' 74 In essence, this excep-
169 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (West Supp. 1991).
170 See infra notes 172-178 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
172 Russell v. Windsor Properties, Inc., 366 So. 2d 219, 223 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
(citing Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957); D'Albora v. Tulane University,
274 So. 2d 825 (La. Ct. App. 1973)). Solidary obligations are analogous to joint
and several liability but evolve from codal obligations found in Louisiana Civil
Code Article 1794: "An obligation is solidary for the obligor when each obligor is
liable for the whole performance. A performance rendered by one of the solidary
obligors relieves the others of liability toward the obligee." LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 1794 (West 1987).
13 Boroughs, 337 So. 2d at 342.
174 Id.
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tion strives to prevent negligence by giving incentives to
employers to oversee their contractor's work, if at all pos-
sible. Therefore, the exception to the rule posits that any
liability arising out of inherently dangerous activities is
nondelegable1 75  The employer and the independent
contractor are jointly and severally liable for torts com-
mitted by the independent contractor. 176  At the same
time that courts declare cropdusting to be an inherently
dangerous activity, they paint a fine line between inher-
ently dangerous activities and ultrahazardous activities.
Cropdusting is usually the former but not the latter.177
Thus, in most cases, a plaintiff can count on not only
the aerial applicator (independent contractor) as a liable
defendant but the landowner-farmer (employer) as well.
Of course, if the aerial applicator negligently injures a
neighboring landowner through his operations, the aerial
applicator may have to indemnify his farmer-employer. 78
B. MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
Generally, aerial application litigation against manufac-
turers involves two separate genres. In one type of case,
the plaintiff alleges that a chemical is defectively manufac-
tured or incorrectly labelled. The other type of case as-
serts that the manufacturer breached an implied or
express warranty. In both scenarios a verdict against the
defendant/manufacturer offers the plaintiff another deep
pocket to compensate him for his injury.
'75 Id.; Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying
Florida law).
176 See Frazier v. Moeller, 665 S.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983,
writ dism'd); Gragg v. Allen, 481 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972,
writ dism'd); Leonard, 357 S.W.2d at 782. But see Pitchfork Land, 346 S.W.2d at 604
(holding an aerial applicator as an independent contractor distinguished out of
relevance by later opinions).
177 Boroughs, 337 So. 2d at 343; Ligocky v. Wilcox, 620 P.2d 1300, 1301-02
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 553 (Wis. 1984).
178 For examples of negligent acts of cropdusters, see Aerial Agric. Serv. Agric.
v. Richard, 264 F.2d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1959); Goodpasture, Inc. v. S. &J. Farms,
Inc., 528 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ); Ferris v. Moore,
441 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, no writ).
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One of the first cases in which a defendant impleaded a
chemical manufacturer into aerial application litigation
was Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor.179 In this dispute,
plaintiff's cotton was damaged by defendant's aerial ap-
plication of 2,4-D to defendant's rice crop. The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court verdict for the de-
fendant rice farmer because it found no negligence on his
part. 8 0 Chapman, however, was found liable for plain-
tiff's injury because the company did not adequately test
its product to accurately determine its capacity to drift
when applied.' The company had agreed that it was not
aware of the product's drift characteristics; however, the
Arkansas Supreme Court found that strict liability gov-
erned this case and charged Chapman with the knowledge
that tests of its products would have revealed.8 2
Later cases do not charge a manufacturer with strict lia-
bility but rather use a negligence standard of care. A
breach of this standard of care by a manufacturer can be
inferred from circumstantial evidence via the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. 8 3 This theory enables plaintiffs to get to
the jury by proving that there was injury to their property
that does not normally occur without negligence and that
the defendant/manufacturer controlled the instrumental-
ity that may have harmed the plaintiff. In Tide Products,
Inc. v. Browning,'8 4 the plaintiff won a jury verdict, and the
Texas court of appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of
plaintiff's proof that his peanut crop died after being
sprayed with chemicals contaminated by residues in the
sprayer's equipment.18 5 The peanuts died in a pattern
consistent with the residue causing the damage - in
179 222 S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1949).
,so Id. at 825.
18, Id. at 827.
182 Id.
183 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 268 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Cal. 1954); Tide Prods.,
Inc. v. Browning, 493 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ
dism'd by agr.).
8.4 493 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd by agr.).
185 Id. at 655.
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swaths as applied by a plane and decreasing in severity the
further away from the point of initial application.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs still must prove that a manufac-
turer has breached a standard of care, a burden that sev-
eral plaintiffs could not carry. In Potmesil v. E.I duPont
deNemours Co.,186 plaintiff charged that the manufacturer
should have labelled its liquid chemical to clearly warn
farmers that the liquid was twice as strong as its powder
form. 87 The Louisiana court of appeals flatly rejected
this contention and reversed the trial court's finding that
the label was confusing. 8 8 A thorough examination of
the instructions on the label of the product and the
farmer's experience in using chemicals convinced the
court that the farmer and not the manufacturer was at
fault in this case. 189
Likewise, in Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson
Corp. 190 and Rayner v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,191 plaintiffs
charged that a chemical damaged their crops but could
not establish by the weight of the evidence that the de-
fendant's chemical caused the damage. 92 In Asgrow-Kil-
gore, the plaintiff cultivated caladiums, a type of
ornamental plant. Plaintiff presented evidence that spray-
ing by a neighbor adversely affected the crop, but other
evidence showed that the crop was substandard before
the spraying occurred.19 3 The Florida Supreme Court,
therefore, ruled that the trial court could have found that
the neighbor's spraying was a cause, but not a proximate
cause, of the damage to plaintiff's crops. 19 4 The court
then reversed the Florida district court of appeal and rein-
stated the trial court's finding of no liability.195
186 408 So. 2d 315 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
,87 Id. at 320.
188 Id. at 319.
189 Id.
,90 301 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1974).
19, 585 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
192 Asgrow-Kilgore, 301 So. 2d at 442-43; Rayner, 585 P.2d at 1247.




In Rayner, plaintiff planted a potato crop and prepared
his land for that crop in advance with various chemicals.196
The plants began to develop in an abnormal fashion. Af-
ter consultation with his county agricultural extension
agent, plaintiff attempted to isolate the chemicals that
damaged his potatoes. The next year he treated some of
his acreage with both Eptam, a herbicide manufactured by
Stauffer, and Telone, an insecticide made by Dow Chemi-
cal, and the rest solely with Telone. Once again, plain-
tiff's potatoes appeared abnormal, and plaintiff asserted
that this only occurred on the fields treated with Eptam.I97
Plaintiff sued Staufer, the manufacturer of Eptam.
In a battle of experts, the defendant displayed to the
jury that the kinds of damage Eptam could cause to plants
were different from the damage to plaintiff's potatoes. 98
Several experts with extensive experience growing pota-
toes in other areas of the country also testified that Eptam
never damaged their potatoes. 99 The jury found in favor
of defendant.20 0 On appeal, plaintiff challenged various
pieces of evidence that the trial court allowed before the
jury. The Arizona court of appeals found that the experts'
testimony was correctly allowed into evidence by the trial
court and upheld the jury verdict.20 '
The second genre of cases against chemical manufac-
turers in aerial application litigation involves claims of
breach of warranty by the manufacturer. 0 2 These opin-
ions wrestle with interpretation of the various state enact-
ments of the Uniform Commercial Code. In general,
these cases are based on the chemical product's non-com-
196 Rayner, 585 P.2d at 1242.
197 Id. at 1243.
198 Id.
19 Id. at 1243-44.
2-0 Id. at 1242.
201 Id. at 1244-45.
202 See Lindeman v. Eli Lilly and Co., 816 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1987); Earl Brace &
Sons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 268 P.2d 1041 (Cal. 1954); Schwetner v. Nalco Chem. Co., 615
S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, writ dism'd); Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-
Tunnell, 516 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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pliance with the conditions, warranties, or warnings which
the manufacturer placed on the chemical product label.
For instance, in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co. ,20 the labels of
the product DDTOL, supplied to the plaintiff, did not no-
tify consumers that the ten percent inert ingredients of
the chemical contained another chemical, 2,4-D.2 °4 The
fact that the 2,4-D killed the plaintiff's cotton crop was the
essence of plaintiff's cause of action.20 5
Two cases dealing with Texas law have delineated the
U.C.C.'s application to chemicals applied by aerial appli-
cators. In Elanco Products Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 20 6 a Texas
court of appeals mandated that to maintain a cause of ac-
tion for breach of warranty, plaintiff must show compli-
ance with the express conditions on the chemical's label
instructions. °7 The plaintiff's application of the herbi-
cide in greater than five mile per hour winds and failure to
mix the herbicide with five to ten gallons of water per acre
contradicted the instructions given by the manufacturer.
The plaintiff therefore recovered nothing. 20 8
In Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,209 the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Texas law, affirmed a
judgment for the plaintiff based on breach of a manufac-
turer's express warranty.210 Recovery of any damages is
premised on compliance with label instructions as in
Elanco Products.21' The Lindemann court first concluded
that the plaintiff's "split" application of the herbicide was
not inconsistent with label instructions.2 2 The court then
acknowledged other possible causes of the excessive
weeds in the Lindemann fields but affirmed the jury find-
203 Burr, 268 P.2d at 1041.
204 Id. at 1049.
205 Id. at 1043.
20- 516 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207 Id. at 731.
208 Id.
20- 816 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1987).
210 Id. at 202.
211 Id. at 201.
212 Id.
ing of a breach of an express warranty. 1
The trial court found that the manufacturer's conse-
quential damages limitation of the refund of the purchase
price was unconscionable. 2 t4 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the trial court on this issue.2 15 The Fifth Circuit found
that section 2-719(3) of the U.C.C. allowed limitation of
consequential damages if a loss is in a commercial con-
text.21 6 Additionally, the court did not find any Texas
case holding as unconscionable a clause in a contract that
excluded consequential damages on a commercial prod-
uct.2 1 7 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit awarded the plaintiff
$6000 in actual damages, effectively upholding the dam-
ages limitation.218
Finally, in Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,219 the
court held that a disclaimer on a chemical product en-
closed in a booklet sold with every product operates to
preclude consequential damages.220 In this case, the
plaintiff argued that such a disclaimer and limitation of
damages was unconscionable, unenforceable, and con-
trary to section 2-316 of the U.C.C. The district court re-
jected these arguments and specifically noted that
Pennsylvania section 2-316 only protects a buyer where
the disclaimer is irreconcilable with an express war-
ranty. 22' The district court granted summary judgment to
the defendant/manufacturer because it found only a dis-
claimer and no express warranty was present.22 2
C. INSURANCE
Various jurisdictions have faced questions of insurance
law arising out of coverage disputes over aerial applica-
21- Id. at 202.
214 Lindemann, 816 F.2d at 203.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 204.
218 Id. at 205.
219 708 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
220 Id. at 710.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 711.
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tion in farmer insurance policies. Many of these cases
only interpret insurance policies. The cases analyzed here
are noteworthy because of their factual backgrounds.
In Aerial Agricultural Service of Montana, Inc. v. Till,2 23 a
Mississippi federal district court analyzed an insurance
policy to determine whether it covered the defective oper-
ation of a seeding device that the insured had invented.22 4
The insured utilized this device to aerially seed a client's
fields. When the client sued claiming improper distribu-
tion of the seed in the field and was awarded a judgment,
the question remained as to whether the aerial applica-
tor's insurance policy would absorb the loss.
The basis of the insurance company's argument was
that its policy covered only "occurrences," which the
company defined as "accidents." The insurer argued that
the insured aerial applicator purposely adjusted its own
seed applicator and seeded the field improperly. This in-
tentional adjustment of the applicator, continued the in-
surer, removed the situation from any classification as
accidental. The court rejected this argument, holding the
definition of "occurrence" to be ambiguous.225 Though
Aerial intentionally created the situation with the mal-
functioning seeder, it did not intend uneven seed distri-
bution. Therefore, the "occurrence" language of the
policy covered the insured's claim.226
In Willis v. Willis, 227 a Florida district court of appeal,
denied a defendant's cross-claim against his insurer be-
cause the defendant/insured specifically declined chemi-
cal liability insurance in his application.2 28 Similarly, in
Emmco Insurance Co. v. Marshall Flying Service, Inc. ,229 an ae-
rial applicator applied for chemical damage coverage, but
the policy provided by the insurer did not cover that even-
223 207 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Miss. 1962).
224 Id. at 55.
225 Id. at 57.
226 Id. at 59.
227 245 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
228 Id. at 303.
229 325 So. 2d 453, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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tuality. When the aerial applicator became involved in a
chemical damage claim and had no insurance coverage,
the aerial applicator still sued the insurer to cover the ac-
cident. The court found that the insured had applied
properly for the chemical damage insurance coverage and
that the insurance agent knew or should have known of
the request.230 Therefore, the insurance company was
found responsible for the damage caused by the aerial
applicator.23 '
In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Adams,23 2
a person was injured by methyl parathion sprayed by an
aerial applicator. The insureds had a Farmer's Compre-
hensive Personal Insurance policy that excluded coverage
"(c) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or un-
loading of: (1) any aircraft; . . . (n) to property damage
arising out of any substance released or discharged from
any aircraft. 2 33 The insureds claimed that these exclu-
sions only applied to aircraft that they personally oper-
ated, as opposed to aircraft operators with whom they
contracted to spray their fields. The Texas court of ap-
peals agreed with the insureds' argument by holding that
bodily injury was covered so long as the insured plaintiffs
did not themselves operate the plane.23 4 The court
found, however, that exclusion (n) did operate to exclude
property damage caused by an aerial application
contractor. 5
In Farm Flying Service v. Southeastern Aviation Services,
Inc.,236 plaintiff/insured sprayed the wrong crop. The in-
surance policy in question excluded "injury to or destruc-
tion of any crops, pastures, trees or tangible property to
which the aerial application is deliberately made whether
2-0 Id. at 454.
231 Id.
232 570 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
233 Id. at 568-69.
234 Id. at 571.
235 Id.
236 254 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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in error or not. ' 237 A California court of appeal ruled that
because this exclusion unambiguously precluded any lia-
bility on the part of the insurer, it was not liable. 38
In Leger v. St. Landry Aerial Applicators, Inc. ,239 the plain-
tiff/insured claimed that the aerial applicator improperly
mixed the chemicals and caused damage to his crops.
The insurance policy excluded, "injury to or destruction
of any property in or upon the field, adjacent field, area or
premises owned, occupied, rented or in the care, custody
or control of the farmer, owner or grower for whom the
aerial application is being performed by the Insured. ' 240
The court had no trouble affirming a summary judgment
in favor of the insurer under these facts.2 4 1
A more complex question arose in Little v. Kalo Laborato-
ries, Inc. ,242 where insurance coverage from chemical drift
was at issue.243 The insurance policy excluded coverage
for "the ownership, maintenance, or use, including the
loading or unloading of ... aircraft ' 244 yet the policy did
cover the "accidental discharge, dispersal, release or es-
cape of chemicals [and] damage to farm crops and live-
stock arising out of the application of farm
chemicals .... -245 The court found that "[w]here the
damage flows from the chemicals unrelated to use of the
aircraft the risk is one clearly intended to be covered as
reflected by the language of exclusion (m) and the aircraft
use exclusion is inapplicable. ' 246  Because potential
causes of the chemical damage to a neighboring farm
could have been granulization or volatilization, a factual
issue remained for resolution at trial, and summary judg-
237 Id. at 2.
238 Id. at 3.
2-9 399 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
240 Id. at 761.
241 Id. at 762.
242 406 So. 2d 678 (La. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denid, 410 So. 2d 1133 (La. 1982).
24s Id. at 679.
244 Id. at 680.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 682.
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ment was inappropriate.24 7
VI. REGULATORY CONTROL BY FEDERAL AND
STATE GOVERNMENTS
Federal and state governmental entities exercise con-
trol over the aerial application industry in two areas: reg-
ulation of aviation and regulation of pesticides. The
FAA's regulation of agricultural aircraft application of
pesticides applies throughout the United States and sets
minimum standards for pilots and their aircraft.248 The
FAA requires all aerial applicator pilots to hold an agricul-
tural aircraft operator certificate.2 49 Application for a cer-
tificate is made according to procedures formulated by
the FAA District Office that has jurisdiction over the
area. 250 To receive a certificate, the applicant must be cer-
tified, airworthy, and equipped for agricultural opera-
tion.25' Moreover, the applicant must already have a
current U.S. commercial or airline transport pilot certifi-
cate252 and must prove knowledge of pre-starting opera-
tions, safe handling of economic poisons, and safe
operation of the aircraft.253 The FAA regulations also
mandate certain minimum operating standards of height
and areas of operation.254
The FAA regulations specifically mandate that eco-
nomic poisons dispensed or applied by holders of agricul-
tural aircraft operator certificates must be registered with
the United States Department of Agriculture under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
247 Id. at 683.
248 14 C.F.R. §§ 137.1-.77 (1992).
249 Id. § 137.11.
25o Id. § 137.15.
251 Id. § 137.19(d).
252 Id. § 137.19(b)-(c).
253 Id. § 137.19(e)(1)(i)-(ii).
25 Id. §§ 137.43, 137.45, 137.49, 137.51, 137.53; see also Cannon v.Jones, 377
So. 2d 1055, 1057 (Miss. 1979) (when aerial applicator plane struck flagman on
ground, plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to predicate liability based on per se
violation of FAA regulation prohibiting the creation of hazards to persons on
ground).
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(FIFRA). 55 In Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 56
the Ninth Circuit rejected an environmental group's at-
tempt to stop aerial spraying of land near an urban area
based on alleged violations of the FAA requirement that
economic poisons aerially applied must comply with
FIFRA. 57 The court found that before spraying near a
residential area, FIFRA requires an Environmental Impact
Statement to satisfy administrative policy. 258 The FAA
and FIFRA statutes on which plaintiffs relied commanded
operators of aerial applicators to follow label instructions
on economic poisons. In this case, the label warned con-
sumers to "avoid breathing of spray and contact with skin
and eyes. '2 -5 9 The Ninth Circuit ruled that no violation of
FIFRA occurred, and therefore it did not reach the ques-
tion of whether FIFRA created a private right of action for
citizens.26 °
Every applicator in the United States must comply with
FIFRA under FAA regulations. FIFRA now governs the
use, sale, and labeling of regulated pesticides produced
and sold in intrastate and interstate commerce. 26' Addi-
tionally, in conjunction with the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, state governments increasingly maintain
FIFRA enforcement authority as well as pesticide, eco-
nomic poison, and aerial application regulations of their
own. 2 62 The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wis-
consin Public Intervenor v. Mortier2 63 also guarantees that
local governmental authorities may regulate aerial appli-
cators in the future.26 4
255 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -136y (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 137.39 (1992).
25 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983).
257 Id. at 904.
2- Id. at 906.
259 Id. at 905.
20 Id. at 904.
261 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1988); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991-92
(1984).
262 7 U.S.C. § 136u, w-I (1988); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 11901-11911
(West 1986) (pest control aircraft operation regulations). LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3:3221, 3224, 3242, 3252 (West 1987 and Supp. 1992).
26- 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
264 Id. at 2486-87.
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In Mortier, a local government in Wisconsin passed an
ordinance requiring aerial applicators to apply for permis-
sion to spray within its boundaries according to specific
procedures. When Mr. Mortier applied for permission to
aerially spray his lands and was refused, he filed suit
claiming that FIFRA and certain Wisconsin statutes pre-
empted the local governmental body from regulation of
pesticide use. The Supreme Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice White, ruled that neither FIFRA nor its
legislative history evidenced a congressional intention to
exclusively regulate pesticide use. 265  Therefore, the
Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin courts, which had
declared that FIFRA and the Wisconsin statutes pre-
empted action by local governments in this field.266
At least in California, state enforcement agencies have
utilized their state statutory and regulatory schemes to
control aerial application closely.2 67 As early as 1928, Cal-
ifornia courts recognized that violation of state regulatory
measures constituted negligence per se in tort litigation
between neighboring landowners whose crops were dam-
aged by drift. 268 The California Department of Food and
Agriculture has effectively pursued litigation for the revo-
cation of aerial application licenses from pilots who vio-
late the state regulation. In Holt v. Department of Food and
Agriculture,269 the state authorities prosecuted a pilot and
his employer for reckless or negligent violations of certain
regulations.27 ° When the department fully documented
its allegations against the aerial applicator, the California
courts sustained the license suspension imposed by the
265 Id. at 2487.
26 The Supreme Court decision effectively overruled other state supreme court
decisions in People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150
(Cal. 1984) and Central Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189
(Me. 1990).
267 See infra notes 268-272 and accompanying text.
268 See Andreen v. Escondido Citrus Union, 269 P. 556, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.
1928).
269 218 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
270 Id. at 3.
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department against the pilot and his employer. 7' Califor-
nia aerial applicators and other applicators within states
who have chosen to comprehensively regulate pesticides
should be aware of the use of these regulations as the ve-
hicles for tort liability as well as administrative
penalties. 2
Finally, some state regulations mandate that landown-
ers who sustain damage to their property must follow cer-
tain procedures in order to pursue tort litigation to
recoup their damages. An Oklahoma statutory scheme
states:
No action for such alleged damages to growing annual
crops or plants may be brought or maintained, however,
unless the person claiming the damages shall have filed
with the Board a written statement of alleged damages, on
a form prescribed by the Board, within ninety (90) days
after the date that the alleged damages occurred, or prior
to the time that twenty-five percent (25%) of the crop
damaged shall have been harvested.273
In Short v. Jones,274 plaintiff's pecan trees were perma-
nently damaged by a neighbor's aerial application of her-
bicide. The lower appellate court reversed the trial
court's verdict for the plaintiff because the plaintiff did
not follow the proper statutory procedure. 275  The
Oklahoma Supreme Court did not invalidate the statute as
a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for annual crop dam-
age in Oklahoma courts. 76 Instead, since the damage to
the trees could be termed damage to real property, the
court rested its affirmance of the trial court's damage
271 Id. at 7.
272 Accord Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Wis. 1984) (violation of
state regulation by aerial applicator results in negligence per se liability); see also
Sarah E. Redfield, Chemical Trespass? - An Overview of Statutory and Regulatory Efforts
to Control Pesticide Drift, 73 Ky. L.J. 855, 885-87 (1985) (encyclopedic examination
of state pesticide regulatory measures).
273 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 3-82(d) (West Supp. 1992).
274 613 P.2d 452 (Okla. 1980).
275 Id. at 454.
276 Id.
award on a separate basis - damage to realty.277
Oklahoma thus mandates strict adherence to its statutory
scheme; otherwise plaintiff's case can be dismissed on a
demurrer.278
In contrast to the jurisprudence of Oklahoma, Kansas
recently completely invalidated its statutory scheme which
stated:
In order to maintain a civil action, a person damaged from
pesticide application shall have filed with the county attor-
ney of the county in which the damage occurred, a written
statement, on a form prescribed by the secretary, claiming
that he or she has been damaged. Such form shall be filed
within sixty (60) days after the date damage was discov-
ered. Such statement shall contain, but shall not be lim-
ited to, the name of the person responsible for the
application of said pesticide and/or the name of the owner
or lessee of the land on which it is alleged that the damage
occurred ... 279
In Ernest v. Faler,28 ° plaintiff's walnut trees were dam-
aged by pesticide drift from an aerial application on a
neighbor's crops. The defendant secured a summary
judgment at the trial level by pointing out plaintiff's fail-
ure to file a report with the county attorney, although
plaintiff did file a report with the secretary of agriculture,
the adjacent landowner, and the defendant pesticide ap-
plicator.28 ' The Kansas Supreme Court struck down the
law as a violation of the United States and Kansas consti-
tutional guarantees of due process and equal protec-
tion.282  The court determined that the statute
unreasonably deprived a citizen of a right through means
that do not have a real or substantial relationship to the
277 Id. at 455.
27R Id. at 454; see also Schroeder Aviation, Inc. v. De Fehr, 283 N.W.2d 147, 152
(N.D. 1979) (jurisdictional statutory prerequisite to pesticide claim upheld as
constitutional).
279 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2457 (1979) (repealed 1986).
2180 697 P.2d 870 (Kan. 1985).
281 Id. at 871-72.
282 Id. at 879.
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objective sought: notification of involved parties in a
timely manner.283 Despite Kansas' rejection of statutes
barring the maintenance of civil actions for failure to file a
damage statement, North Dakota, Oregon, and Oklahoma
still have such regulations. 84
VII. CONCLUSION
The field of aerial application of pesticides has provided
our courts with many types of litigation. Overall, how-
ever, the liability of the industry has been restricted to re-
sponsibility for damage that can accurately be traced to
immediate drift of the economic chemical. With the ad-
vent of more scientific evidence and investigative tech-
niques to determine how certain chemicals get into
groundwater or other areas where damage to persons or
property can occur, the aerial application industry must
carefully and closely monitor the courts in the next few
years to assure that tenuous and speculative theories of
liability do not cripple the economic viability of the
industry.
The costs of pesticide drift should certainly be placed
on those responsible, but ultimately the health of the ae-
rial application industry is closely linked to the viability of
American agriculture as a whole. Trace amounts of eco-
nomic poisons should not be used to create liability for
aerial applicators or the farmers they serve. Without spe-
cific evidence to prove causation and the parties responsi-
ble, the courts should refrain from holding the aerial
application industry from specious and overwhelming lia-
bility. The person ultimately harmed will be the Ameri-
can consumer as such liability will translate into lower
quantities of agricultural output and higher prices. Also,
liability and the resulting higher production costs for
American farmers could result in the transfer of more ag-
ricultural production outside the boundaries of the
285 Id. at 876-77.
284 Id. at 877-78.
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United States. In that scenario, food stuffs produced in
other nations are not subject to strict American controls
of pesticides and quality. 5
285 Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990); cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 671 (1991) (foreign plaintiff sued chemical manufacturer for injuries
that he received from DBCP, a pesticide used in his home country of Costa Rica
but banned in the United States).
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